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Expanding Patent Coverage:
Policy Implications of Diamond v. Chakrabarty
The present patent laws' provide that a patentee may receive a seventeen
year right to exclude others from using his idea in consideration for his public
disclosure of the idea.2 Traditionally viewed as a reward for the inventor's
efforts,3 this right to patent protection is given for a wide variety of subjects.4
In the recent case of Diamond v. Chakrabarty, the Supreme Court added a
new item to the list of patentable things-man-made living matter. In reaching
the conclusion that a new oil-eating microorganism was patentable, the
Court's majority stated that it was only construing the terms of section 101,6
the subject matter statute of the patent system, in light of congressional intent
7
and the common meanings of the statute's words. Indeed, the majority was
especially critical of any effort to inject policy considerations into patent
review.8 A careful analysis of the Court's opinion, however, reveals serious
interpretive problems in the rationale used by the Court.9 A better explana-
tion of the holding may be that the Chakrabarty decision reflects a policy
1. 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-293 (1976).
2. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1976). Cf. Bloomer v. McQuewan, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 539, 549 (1852) ("The franchise
which the patent grants, consists altogether in the right to exclude every one from making, using, or vending the
thing patented, without the permission of the patentee.").
3. 1 A. DELLER, WALKER ON PATENTS § 6 (2d ed. 1964).
4. Patentable subject matter is limited by 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1976), which provides that a patent may be
issued to the inventor of "any new and useful process, machine, manufacture or composition of
matter .... '
5. 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
6. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1976).
7. 447 U.S. at 307. The recent literature concerning the case similarly treats the question as a statutory inter-
pretation problem. See, e.g., Behringer, Germ Warfare in the Patent Courts, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 883 (1980); Cooper,
Patent Protection for New Forms of Life, 38 FED. B.J. 34 (1979); Note, Legislation for the Patenting of Living
Organisms: Specificity, Public Safety and Ethical Considerations, 7 J. LEG. 113 (1980); Comment, Bergy,
Flook, and Micro-organisms as Patentable Products, 29 CATH. U. L. REV. 485 (1980); Comment, Ownership of
Living Inventions-In re Bergy, 29 DEPAUL L. REV. 215 (1979); Comment, Implications of the Plant Patent Act
for the Patentability of Micro-organisms, 39 MD. L. REV. 376 (1979).
8. 447 U.S. 303, 314-18 (1980).
9. See text accompanying notes 50-162 infra.
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choice to allow patents not only to reward inventors for their ideas, but also to
provide them sufficient time to protect prospects for commercial develop-
ment. ' 0
I. THE OPINION
The Supreme Court in Chakrabarty addressed only the issue of whether
patent claims for a man-made microorganism capable of degrading four kinds
of hydrocarbons were valid." In 1972 Chakrabarty filed a patent application
asserting claims for the process for making the microorganism, for the me-
dium to spread it, and for the microorganism itself.'2 The Patent Office
granted patents for the process and the medium' 3 but rejected the claims for
the microorganism.' 4 The rejection was based on two grounds: first, the
Patent Office held the subject was a "product of nature" like a naturally
occurring organism; and second, it held that living matter was not patentable
subject matter in general, whether or not man-made. 5 On appeal, the Patent
Office Board of Appeals upheld the denial of the patent by agreeing that living
matter in general was not patentable, reasoning that the 1930 plant patent
statutes would have been unnecessary if living matter were patentable.' 6 The
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, however, reversed the Board's deci-
sion, basing its reversal on its earlier holding in In re Bergy' 7 that living matter
was patentable. '8 When the Supreme Court subsequently remanded Bergy to
be considered in light of its then-recent decision of Parker v. Flook,'9 the
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals vacated Chakrabarty and consolidated
the case with Bergy.20 The court reaffirmed both Bergy and Chakrabarty,', at
which point the government successfully petitioned the Supreme Court for a
writ of certiorari.22
10. See text accompanying notes 163-202 infra.
II. 447 U.S. 303, 307 (1980). The microorganism is unique in its ability to degrade four types of hydro-
carbons. Similar ones in nature can dissolve only one. Chakrabarty created the microorganism by engineering
four plasmids. or genetic pathways, into the organism. Id. at 305 n. I.
12. Id. at 305-06.
13. Id. at 306.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 306. The 1930 and 1970 plant patent statutes set out below provide that certain asexually and
sexually reproduced plants may receive special patent or registration consideration without having to meet the
full description requirements found in the general patent system. The 1930 law, 35 U.S.C. § 161 (1976), provides
in part: "Whoever invents or discovers and asexually reproduces any distinct and new variety of plant,
including cultivated spores, mutants, hybrids, and newly found seedlings, other than a tuber propagated plant or
a plant found in an uncultivated state, may obtain a patent therefor .... This section does not cover plant-
type bacteria. In re Arzbarger, 112 F.2d 834 (C.C.P.A. 1940).
The 1970 law, 7 U.S.C. § 2402(a) (1976), provides, in part: "The breeder of any novel variety of sexually
reproduced plant (other than fungi, bacteria, or first generation hybrids) who has so reproduced the variety or
his successor in interest, shall be entitled to plant variety protection therefore .....
17. 563 F.2d 1031 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
18. 447 U.S. 303, 306 (1980).
19. 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
20. 447 U.S. 303, 306 (1980).
21. 596 F.2d 952 (C.C.P.A. 1979).
22. 447 U.S. 303, 307 (1980). The Bergy claims were subsequently declared moot and dismissed because the
claims were for a purification of a naturally occurring culture. 444 U.S. 1028 (1980).
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In the opinion of the Supreme Court, authored by Chief Justice Burger
for five members, the issue was limited to "whether respondent's micro-
organism constitutes a 'manufacture' or 'composition of matter' within the
meaning of the statute." ' The Court stated the issue could be resolved by a
construction of section 101, in light of its contemporary meaning and without
the introduction of limitations that Congress had not expressed. 24 Based on
the common understanding that the terms of the statute were generally inclu-
sive, the Court concluded their use was sufficient evidence that "Congress
plainly contemplated that the patent laws would be given wide scope."
25
The Court found support for its view in the legislative history of the
patent laws.26 Relying on letters by Thomas Jefferson encouraging adoption of
a patent system,27 the consistent use of the same terms of section 101
throughout the history of the patent statutes,- and the legislative history
accompanying the 1952 recodification of them, 29 the Court reasoned that
Congress intended to maintain a broad construction of the section.30
The Court, however, rejected the view that no limits to section 101 exist.
Natural phenomena, such as natural minerals and gravity, were not patent-
able, according to the Court, because they were "'manifestations
of ... nature, free to all men and reserved exclusively to none."' 3 ' The
microorganism, though, was distinguishable from natural phenomena: "[B]y
contrast, the patentee [had] produced a new bacterium with markedly differ-
ent characteristics from any found in nature .... His discovery was not
nature's handiwork, but his own; accordingly it [was] patentable subject
matter under § I01.-32
The Court also rejected the Government's argument that the passage of
the plant patent statutes evidenced that other living matter was not patent-
able. First, the Court concluded that the passage of the statutes was meant
merely to lower patentability requirements for plant breeders. 33 Second,
"Congress recognized [in passing the plant patent acts only] that the relevant
distinction was not between living and inanimate things, but between prod-
ucts of nature, whether living or not, and human-made inventions." 34 Third,
because the Court would not read limitations into the general statute, the fact
that bacteria did not receive patent protection by either the 1930 or the 1970
23. 447 U.S. 303, 307 (1980).
24. Id. at 308.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 7-10 (1966), for a discussion of the Framers' views on
which the Court relied.
28. 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980). See Federico, Commentary on the New Patent Act, in 35 U.S.C.A. § 1, 15
(1954).
29. S. REP. NO. 1979, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in [1952] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2394;
H.R. REP. NO. 1923, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1952).
30. 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980).
31. Id. at 309 (quoting Funk Bros. Seed Co., v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 330 U.S. 127, 130 (1947)).
32. 447 U.S. 303, 310 (1980).
33. Id. at 311-12.
34. Id. at 313.
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plant statutes did not indicate that Congress meant to exclude bacteria from
section 101 coverage.3"
The Court also rejected the argument that the microorganism could not
be patented until Congress expressly authorized coverage. To this end, the
government had argued on the basis of language in Flook that "the judiciary
'must proceed cautiously when ... asked to extend patent rights into areas
wholly unforeseen by Congress.' -36 Although the Court recognized that the
congressional role in the patent area was to define the scope of coverage, it
went on to state that once Congress has acted, the judiciary is duty bound to
construe the meaning of the statute guided by the legislative history and
statutory purpose of the enactment.37 Viewed this way, that the statute was
meant to be broadly construed is evidenced by the congressional choice to use
broad language consistent with the congressional objectives.38 Thus, the
Court concluded that no ambiguity existed that required additional congres-
sional direction concerning the microorganism.39
The Court further stated that Flook could not be read to require that
Congress contemplate a scientific area before a patent is available for it.40
Indeed, the Court noted that such a view would frustrate the objectives of the
patent system to promote new efforts at the edges of man's knowledge:
"Congress employed broad general language in drafting § 101 precisely be-
cause such inventions are often unforeseeable.,'4 Nor would the Court con-
sider the potential hazards that might result from genetic research, noting that
the research would continue regardless of the support patent protection might
afford. 42 Further, the Court claimed it was without the expertise to consider
policy questions like safety; accordingly, these concerns were left more ap-
propriately to Congress.43 Congress itself would be free to limit coverage, but
the Court concluded that until this was done, section 101 "fairly embrace[d]
respondent's invention." 44 Thus, because the Court concluded that the lan-
guage of section 101 was to be construed consistently with the common mean-
ings of the section's terms and the broad statutory purpose underlying the
patent statutes, the microorganism was patentable.
Justice Brennan, joined by Justices White, Marshall, and Powell, dis-
sented from the judgment on the view that microorganisms are not things for
which Congress has specifically provided patent coverage. In the absence of a
legislative direction or common understanding, Justice Brennan stated, it is
Congress that strikes the balance between the costs of the patent monopoly
35. Id.
36. Id. at 314-15 (quoting Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 596 (1978)).




41. Id. at 316.
42. Id. at 317.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 318.
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and the need to encourage progress.45 Judged from this vantage point, he
argued, Congress, in fact, had signaled a limitation by enacting carefully
limited coverage of living matter under the plant patent statutes. 46 Reflecting
on the legislative history of the 1930 law, he concluded that Congress believed
a limitation existed and that items outside the law, including bacteria, were
excluded.47 Similarly, Congress continued the exclusion of bacteria under the
1970 law. 48 Justice Brennan concluded, therefore, that Congress had "legis-
lated in the belief that § 101 does not encompass living organisms."-49
II. ANALYSIS
A. Defining the Problem: Divergent Approaches to Statutory Construction
The interpretive concerns expressed by both the majority and minority in
Chakrabarty reflect the statutory problem, inherent in the patent system, of
identifying patentable subjects. Because there is no common law patent right,
any patent protection is available only as a privilege provided to the inventor
by the state.50 To this end, the Framers of the Constitution provided that
Congress would have the permissive authority to create a patent system.5 '
Congress could choose, of course, not to enact a patent system. 2 Similarly,
Congress might limit, and apparently has limited, the scope of patent protec-
tion to a class of articles that is less inclusive than the class of all inventive
ideas.5 3 The critical problem, then, becomes the identification of the class of
ideas for which Congress has chosen to provide patent protection.
As the statutory language indicates, not all inventions are patentable. The
present statutes defining patentability, sections 101 to 103, establish three
limiting criteria.5 4 Section 101 specifies the types of things that may be
patented: "any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composi-
tion of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof .... , Patent-
ability of something that falls into one of these categories, however, is "sub-
ject to the conditions and requirements" of sections 102 and 103.56 Respec-
tively, these sections provide that the invention be both new and substantially
different. Essentially "an amplification of 'new' in section 101,- 57 the novelty
requirement of section 102 provides that a previously known or patented idea
45. Id. at 319.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 320.
48. Id. at 321.
49. Id. at 322.
50. 1 A. DELLER, supra note 3, § 6.
51. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
52. P. ROSENBERG, PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS 6-2 (2d ed. 1980).
53. Id.
54. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103 (1976). Section 100 further defines parts of a § 101 "process" to include a
"process, art, or method." See S. REP. No. 1979, supra note 29, at 9.
55. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1976).
56. Id. See S. REP. NO. 1979, supra note 29, at 10.
57. S. REP. NO. 1979, supra note 29, at 10.
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is not again patentable.58 The requirement of section 103 that the invention be
substantially different from previous ones, or in the statutory language, not
"obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill
in the art,"59 was a codification of a judicial standard that had developed more
than a hundred years before the recodification. 60 Thus, for the inventor to
receive a patent, he must establish that his invention meets all three criteria of
patentability: subject matter coverage, novelty, and substantial difference
from previous inventions.6'
Section 101 poses a special problem for the patent applicant because it
enumerates and thereby limits the classes of patentable subject matter. Al-
though Congress has authority to permit patents for any "useful Art," 62 since
1790 Congress has limited the patentable items,63 and only relatively unim-
portant changes in the language have been made in subsequent enactments.
64
Each term of the present limitation-"process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter" 65-is significant because a claim for a patent should
be described in one or another of the statutory classes.66
The problem, however, is that these terms defy precise definition. Al-
though the subjects of the statute may be divided into either processes or
articles,67 the judicial and hornbook definitions of the terms listed in the
statute are not specific. "Process," for example, is defined as "an act, opera-
tion, or step, or... a series thereof, performed upon a specified subject
matter to produce a physical result."' 8 For a process to be patentable, it is
necessary only that the process be new; therefore, a new process that uses
known objects to produce a result is patentable. 69 But a patentable process is
limited generally to one that results from the application of some force that
causes a physical or chemical change (though this does not include mechani-
cal changes such as stamping or binding metal).70
The other patentable classes-machine, manufacture, and composition
of matter-are classified generally as articles. 7' A "machine" is defined as a
device that causes a particular result.72 It may be a new combination of old
58. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1976).
59. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1976).
60. S. REP. NO. 1979, supra note 29, at 10. Although the legislative history indicates the language was
drawn from previous case law, it provides little guidance as to how much difference between old and new is
required. Id. Cf. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966) (interpretations of § 103 requirement).
61. S. REP. NO. 1979, supra note 29, at 10.
62. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
63. P. ROSENBERG, supra note 52, at § 6.01.
64. Id.
65. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1976).
66. P. ROSENBERG, supra note 52, at § 6.01.
67. Id.
68. Id. at § 6.0111]. See also Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 787-88 (1876): "A process is a mode of
treatment of certain materials to produce a given result."
69. 94 U.S. 780, 788 (1876).
70. 1 A. DELLER, supra note 3, § 15.
71. P. ROSENBERG, supra note 52, at § 6.01.
72. Burr v. Duryee, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 531,570(1863). See also P. ROSENBERG, supra note 52, at § 6.01[2].
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parts or a new component, 73 but use of a new component in an old machine
does not make the latter patentable.74 As noted below, "manufacture" con-
sists of those articles that cannot be placed in another category and is de-
scribed as "a residual category of inventive subject matter.. 75 "Composition
of matter," also discussed in greater detail below, includes chemical com-
pounds and physical mixtures or "a combination, union, or association of
ingredients."-76 Accordingly, a wide range of articles are patentable under
section 101, but like "process," the terms do not provide any clear limits on
patentability.
In addition to the coverage provided under section 101, Congress has
provided that certain asexually and sexually reproduced plants may receive
patents or equivalent protection. 77 Essentially, the plant breeder must make
the same showings of novelty as the inventor, but the specificity of the de-
scription78 is reduced to a description "as complete as is reasonably pos-
sible."-79 When the plant patenting statutes are coupled with the provisions of
section 101, the litany of patentable subject matter seemingly "include[s]
anything under the sun that is made by man." 80
Exceptions to patentability fall into two general categories: (1) those
created by judicial application of the patent statutes and (2) those provided by
Congress. Judicial exceptions exclude from patentability discoveries of laws
of nature8' and naturally occurring articles,82 as well as any object whose
novelty is the result of mental activity: for example, printed matter, 83 methods
of doing business, 84 and certain computer programs. 85 These judicial excep-
tions from patent coverage result because the items cannot be adequately
defined, are not really new, or consist only of mental steps. 86 The second
general exception to patentability consists of those things Congress has legis-
latively precluded from patent protection. One example is the blanket statu-
tory exception of inventions useful solely for nuclear weapons. 87 Another is
found in the 1930 plant patent statute that excludes tuber propagated plants
and those found in an uncultivated state. 8 Similarly, the 1970 statute specifi-
cally excludes several sexually reproduced plants, including bacteria, from
73. Seymour v. Osborne, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 516 (1870).
74. I re Hall, 208 F.2d 370 (C.C.P.A. 1953).
75. P. ROSENBERG, supra note 52, at § 6.0113].
76. Id. at § 6.01[4].
77. See 35 U.S.C. § 161 (1976); 7 U.S.C. § 2402(a) (1976).
78. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1976) requires a description "in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable
any person skilled in the art... to make and use the same ......
79. 35 U.S.C. § 162 (1976).
80. S. REP. NO. 1979, supra note 29, at 10.
81. See, e.g., O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62 (1853).
82. See, e.g., Funk Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127 (1948).
83. In re Sterling, 70 F.2d 910 (C.C.P.A. 1934).
84. Munson v. Mayor of New York, 124 U.S. 601 (1888).
85. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
86. P. ROSENBERG, supra note 52, at §§ 6.02[2-f3].
87. 42 U.S.C. § 2181 (1976).
88. 35 U.S.C. § 161 (1976).
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coverage.8 9 Thus, although section 101 and the plant statutes cover a wide
range of subjects, both judicially and legislatively created exceptions limit the
ultimate scope of coverage.
The problem posed in Chakrabarty, as the Court stated, was whether the
microorganism falls into one of the subject matter categories of section 101.90
Both the majority and minority opinions recognized that Congress provided
the basis on which the patentability question should be decided; as the ma-
jority stated, "Congress, not the courts, must define the limits of patent-
ability . . ,,9' Similarly, the minority stated, "It is the role of Congress, not
this Court, to broaden or narrow the reach of the patent laws. '" 92 To deter-
mine the extent of coverage Congress intended, however, the majority and
minority took divergent paths.
Apparently, the majority took a more expansive view of congressional
intent. Specifically, the majority determined that it would look to the common
meaning of the terms and the statutory intent to determine patent coverage. 93
The Court stated it would not read a limitation into coverage unless clearly
expressed by Congress.94 Given the broad statutory purpose noted previously
and the lack of express congresssional limitation of that purpose, the Court
concluded that patent coverage was generally inclusive or expansive. 95
The minority, on the other hand, adopted a view that tended to exclude
items from patent coverage. Initially, the minority stated that a patent should
not be granted in the absence of legislative direction. % If there is some "evi-
dence" of a congressional exclusion-in this case, the limited coverage of
living matter under the plant patent statutes 97-, then the patent should be
denied. Otherwise, the minority concluded, "[T]he Court's decision [would]
not follow the unavoidable implications of the statute."93 Thus, the minority
approach seems more exclusionary, since an express congressional exclusion
was not necessary to justify a patent denial.
These divergent approaches, at one level, may explain the Chakrabarty
opinions. Arguably, the conclusion that either the majority or minority drew
as to patentability was merely a logical result of its initial choice of one
approach to statutory construction over the other.
It is not enough, however, to say that Chakrabarty is explained by the
divergent approaches to interpreting the patent statutes. Even if one accepts
the inclusive approach that the majority opinion seems to advance, the evi-
dence on which the majority relies apparently does not justify its result.
89. 7 U.S.C. § 2402(a) (1976).
90. 447 U.S. 303, 308 (1980).
91. Id. at 315.
92. Id. at 322.
93. Id. at 308, 315.
94. Id. at 308.
95. Id. at 308, 318.
96. Id. at 319.
97. Id. at 319-21.
98. Id. at 321.
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Judged by the majority's criteria for interpreting the statute-the common
meaning of the terms Congress chose and the express legislative intent-there
is ample evidence to support the contrary conclusion that section 101 does not
cover living matter such as the microorganism, or at the very least, that
congressional intent is ambiguous. First, as used in section 101, the terms,
"manufacture" and "composition of matter," do not seem in common usage
to encompass living organisms. Second, despite the broad terms used in sec-
tion 101 and the general intent expressed in its legislative history, it is also
apparent that Congress enacted the plant patent statutes with the view that
living matter was not patentable subject matter under prior law. Thus, even if
the majority's inclusionary approach to statutory interpretation is accepted,
the evidence indicates that the microorganism was not patentable under
section 101.
B. Failure of Justification
I. Common Meanings of Section 101 Terms
The Court in Chakrabarty concluded that the microorganism fell into
either the "manufacture" or "composition of matter" term of section 101. 99
In reaching this conclusion, the Court stated it was using a common or dic-
tionary definition of each term to conclude that Congress intended an inclu-
sive approach to the patent statute because the terms used were themselves
so broad.'0 A careful analysis of the terms and the case law defining them,
however, fails to support the Court's conclusion that Congress contemplated
the inclusion of living matter under either "manufacture" or "composition of
matter."
As indicated by both the majority and minority opinions, there was ini-
tially a general conception that the terms of the patent statute did not include
living matter.'0' Moreover, given a general lack of available precedent for
patentability of living matter, this view probably conformed to the general
view of the patent system. As one author notes, "[P]erhaps no decision can
be found because it was so commonly accepted that plants could not be
patented that no one bothered to test it."' 2 Similarly, at least one federal
court of appeals had indicated that the patent statutes cover only mechanical
types of inventions. 03 Thus, in general, the common perception of section 101
coverage was that the statute did not include living matter.
Additionally, the statutory language does not indicate a choice to include
living matter. For example, the use of the term "manufacture" does not
indicate that Congress meant to encompass all man-made efforts including
creation of living matter. Judged by the definition the Court adopted-"the
99. Id. at 309-10.
100. Id. at 308.
101. Id. at 319 n.1 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
102. Behringer, Germ Warfare in the Patent Courts, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 883, 892 n.72 (1980).
103. Yoder Bros., Inc. v. California-Florida Plant Corp., 537 F.2d 1347 (5th Cir. 1976) (dictum).
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production of articles for use from raw or prepared materials by giving these
materials new forms, qualities, properties, or combinations, whether by hand-
labor or by machinery" -there is obviously no indication that creation of
living matter is "manufacture." Nor may it fairly be implied from the ele-
ments of the definition.
As defined by the Court, a "manufacture" is identified by two elements:
labor and transformation. The first, that manufacture is the result of human
labor, is of little help. The latin roots of the term, in fact, define a manufacture
as something created by labor,'0 5 and arguably everything man uses requires
some human labor.'06 Essentially, this aspect provides little guidance on the
question of whether any man-made object is patentable, and as noted pre-
viously, the common view indicated that living matter was probably ex-
cluded. Nor does the second element of the Court's definition, transforma-
tion, provide the impetus to conclude that living matter is patentable. In the
previous case law, everything from a change in color'07 to an increase in
value ' had been held to constitute the necessary transformation to result in a
"manufacture" in various contexts.'09 Even within the case law standards,
there are so many variations that one knows little more than that a trans-
formation is necessary." 0
The different interpretations of transformation are evidenced in the vari-
ous standards of change that courts have adopted. For example, transforma-
tion has been explained as resulting in a "new quality which gives [a product]
a new and beneficial use,""' or, short of a different name, results in some-
thing "new and different" "2 and having a distinctive character.' The term
has also been defined negatively as not the artificial production of a known
matter," 4 not mere processing," 5 and not a naturally occurring change.
These definitions alone do not suggest the encompassing quality of the term
the majority urges.
Nor do the fact patterns of the cases suggest that the term is encompas-
104. 447 U.S. 303, 308 (1980).
105. In re I. Rheinstron & Sons, Inc., 207 F. 119, 135 (E.D. Ky. 1913).
106. Id.
107. Superior Prod. Co. v. Thomas, 32 F. Supp. 360 (N.D. Texas 1938).
108. Shallus v. United States, 162 F. 653 (4th Cir. 1908).
109. Part of the problem, of course, is that the definition changes with the particular facts of the case. The
Supreme Court, however, apparently regards the use of "manufacture" in the patent statutes and tariff statutes
as similar and used cases concerning the latter in defining manufacture in Chakrabarty. For example, the Court
cited Hartranft v. Wiegmann, 121 U.S. 609 (1877)-a case that concerned the definition of the term in a tariff
action, id. at 615-to support its definition of manufacture. 447 U.S. 303, 309-10 (1980).
110. American Fruit Growers, Inc. v. Brogdex Co., 283 U.S. 1, 12, 13 (1931).
Ill. Steinfur Patents Corp. v. William Beyer, Inc., 62 F.2d 238 (2d Cir. 1932).
112. Hartranft v. Wiegmann, 121 U.S. 609, 612 (1877). The Court relies on this language in its opinion as
well. 447 U.S. 303, 309-10 (1980).
113. In re I. Rheinstron & Sons, Inc., 207 F. 119, 150 (E.D. Ky. 1913).
114. Cochrane v. Badische Anilin and Soda Fabrik, 111 U.S. 293, 311 (1884). But see Binney & Smith Co.
v. United Carbon Co., 125 F.2d 255 (4th Cir.), rev'd on other grounds, 317 U.S. 228 (1942) (the restructuring of a
compound into a more manageable form is patentable in the new form).
115. Duke Power Co. v. Clayton, 274 N.C. 505, 164 S.E.2d 289 (1968).
116. Tide Water Oil Co. v. United States, 171 U.S. 210, 216 (1898). But see Carr v. FTC, 302 F.2d 688 (1st
Cir. 1962) (questioning Tide Water Oil on the issue of necessary sufficiency of the change).
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sing. For example, in one case a creation of cocktail cherries from natural
cherries is a manufacture. " 7 In another, the creation of rot-free oranges from
natural ones is not. "' Both subjects took on a new character, use, or quality,
but as the case results suggest, the necessary amount of transformation lacks
consistent definition and is hardly a reliable indicator of what change in the
raw materials is sufficient to result in a manufacture. As with the requirement
that labor be involved, the requirement of transformation does not indicate
that Congress by its use of the term manufacture meant an inclusive definition
that embraces a microorganism.
The nebulous character of the term "composition of matter" similarly
fails to indicate inclusive coverage. Chief Justice Burger endorsed the view
that "composition of matter" means "'all compositions of two or more sub-
stances and ... all composite articles, whether they be the results of chemi-
cal union, or of mechanical mixture, or whether they be gases, fluids,
powders or solids.""' 9 This definition, on its face, does not include animate
objects. Nor does the case law support a conclusion that it should.
The case law does suggest, of course, that "composition of matter"
encompasses a broad range of articles. Obviously, it includes chemical com-
pounds and the like. 20 It also includes new products resulting from the addi-
tion of a single substance, whether or not the new product takes on a new
use. '2' Interestingly, an extract from living matter is also patentable as a
"composition of matter," ,2 though extracts that result in a purification of the
original product may not be. ,3 Despite the breadth of the "composition of
matter" coverage, however, no patent had been granted for a living organism
with one unlitigated exception-the Pasteur yeast patent.124
Again, it is not clear that the common meaning required a conclusion that
Congress meant to include generally any conceivable composition under
patent protection. Simply, the common conception of patentable subject
matter would tend to exclude some items such as the microorganism. Thus,
although the two categories, "manufacture" and "composition of matter,"
117. In re I. Rheinstron & Sons, Inc., 207 F. 119 (E.D. Ky. 1913).
118. American Fruit Growers, Inc. v. Brogdex Co., 283 U.S. 1 (1931).
119. 447 U.S. 303,308(1980) (quoting Shell Dev. Co. v. Watson, 149 F. Supp. 279,280 (D.D.C. 1957)) (citing
I A. DELLER, WALKER ON PATENTS § 14 (lst ed. 1937).
120. Shell Dev. Co. v. Watson, 149 F. Supp. 279 (D.D.C. 1957), aff'd, 252 F.2d 861 (D.C. Cir.
1958).
121. Rogers v. Ennis, 20 F. Cas. 1113 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1878) (No. 12,010). The case dealt with a new
composition for birch beer. Though the result was birch beer, one ingredient was changed. The court held that
this was a patentable composition of matter. While the case goes to the concept of novelty, it does demonstrate
that the transformation necessary in the manufacture cases apparently is not in issue in those cases that deal
with the composition of matter.
122. Merck & Co. v. Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp., 253 F.2d 156 (4th Cir. 1958) (vitamin B-12 extracted
from microorganism cultures).
123. American Wood Paper Co. v. Fibre Disintegrating Co., 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 566 (1874). The problem of
extracts has changed from a subject matter question to one of novelty under § 102 or nonobviousness under
§ 103. The conception seems to be that the extract may be patentable subject matter, but it may not be different
enough from its source to be patentable. See, efg., In re Kratz, 592 F.2d 1169 (C.C.P.A. 1979); In re Bergstrom,
427 F.2d 1394 (C.C.P.A. 1970), for a discussion of the extract question.
124. 4 OFF. GAZ. PAT. OFF. 91 (1873).
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serve as residual areas for inventions that do not fall into other areas, there is
no indication that Congress meant these categories to include living matter.
The majority recognized that some exclusions do exist by its admission
that some discoveries such as natural phenomena are not patentable subject
matter even though it declared that man-made microorganisms are not so
excluded. 25 The Court, however, erred in its reasoning that previous case law
supported the conclusion that a distinction between natural and man-made
organisms existed. To discover the mistake in the Court's reasoning, one
must return to the patent law fundamentals found in sections 101 to 103 and
compare the rationales for disallowing the natural phenomena patents with
those used to disallow the "applied natural products" patents. 1
26
Fundamentally, it is only for a specific application of an idea to a particu-
lar end within the definition of patentable subject matter (i.e., a "process,"
"machine," manufacture," or "composition of matter") that one may ob-
tain the patent. 27 The denial of patentability in the natural phenomena cases
is based on a belief that natural forces, ideas, and the like, are within the
general store of things available to all men when they are understood or
expressed. 128 For example, high pressure injection was held not patentable in
Le Roy v. Tatham. 129 Similarly, electromagnetism was held not patentable in
O'Reilly v. Morse. 30 Computer programs have likewise been held to be out-
side the scope of patentable subject matter as a mathematical conclusion
similar to a formula or law of nature.' 3 Intrinsic to each of these decisions is
the belief that no one has a claim to the idea or "original cause."', 3 2 Simply,
these discoveries do not evidence any application of the principle to a particu-
lar and useful end that is patentable.
The application of a natural product to a use, however, poses a different
question of patentability. The issue in these cases is not whether the item falls
into a patentable subject matter area, but whether something new and differ-
ent is produced. 133 In a sense, the cases are similar to those dealing with
125. 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980).
126. "Applied natural product," in this sense, is meant to encompass the use of products in their natural
state. For example, a culture of plant inoculant performs the same functions as its naturally occurring compo-
nents. The only change is that one or more types of compounds are brought together.
127. Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948).
128. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 591-92 (1978). See Letter to Oliver Evans, May 1807, 5 WRITINGS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 75-76 (Washington ed. 1871), quoted in Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 8 n.2
(1966).
129. 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156 (1853).
130. 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62 (1854).
131. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594 (1978); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
132. 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156, 175 (1853).
133. See text accompanying notes 55-60 supra. The 1952 revisions codified novelty requirements in 35
U.S.C. § 102, which provides, in part: "A person shall be entitled to a patent unless-(a) the invention was
known or used by others in this country, or patented or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign
country, before the invention thereof by the applicant for patent .... The novelty question is enormously
complicated. Because of the problems posed by the predecessor to § 101, the 1952 recodification separated the
subject matter requirements from the novelty issue, § 102, and introduced a third requirement of nonobvious-
ness, § 103, which previously had been a nonstatutory requirement raised by judicial interpretation. See
Historical and Revision Notes to 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1976).
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aggregates r' because the issue is whether the aggregate is different from its
component parts. 35 The Supreme Court addressed this issue in Funk Brothers
Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co. '36 and concluded that a combination of known
bacteria sold as a leguminous plant inoculant was not patentable. Denying the
patent, the Court stated: "Each species had the same effect it always had.
The bacteria perform in their natural way. Their use in combination does not
improve in any way their natural functioning. They serve the ends nature
originally provided and act quite independently of any effort of the
patentee." 137 Like other unpatentable aggregates, the aggregate of bacteria
did not provide a new result.'3 ' Thus, Funk Brothers Seed Co., insofar as it
concerns living matter, does not go to the issue of the patentability of living
matter under section 101, but addresses the issue of novelty of the inven-
tion. 131
A careful reading of the majority opinion in Chakrabarty reveals some
confusion about the natural phenomena exclusion of section 101. The Court
first noted that the microorganism is not a natural phenomena because it was
uniquely created by the patentee. 40 From this first fact, however, it did not
necessarily follow that the microorganism was patentable as a "manufacture"
or "composition of matter"; as noted earlier, case development and legisla-
tive history simply did not reach the point that would require that conclusion.
To buttress its position, though, the Court argued that the microorganism was
distinct from the naturally occurring bacteria found not patentable in Funk
Brothers Seed Co., apparently in the belief that the earlier case dealt with
section 101 concerns. 141 In this, however, the Court was apparently incorrect
because Funk Brothers Seed Co. was not decided on those grounds, but
rather the patent was denied on the issue of novelty. Thus, the distinction the
Court attempts to draw between naturally occurring organisms and man-made
ones lacks the very support that the Court claimed. Without the dichotomy,
the Court is left without an answer to the fundamental question of whether a
living object is patentable under section 101 and not excluded by a judicial or
legislative exception.
134. An aggregate is a combination of known articles. See I A. DELLER, supra note 3, § 27.
135. Picketing v. McCullough, 104 U.S. 310 (1881) (new machine results from the new effect created by
aggregation of known parts); Reckendorfer v. Faber, 92 U.S. 347 (1875) (rubber tipped pencil in an aggregate
does not perform any distinctive function different from its component parts). See also Wood v. Packer, 17 F.
650 (C.C.N.J. 1883) (coal cart with a chute attached for easier unloading).
136. 333 U.S. 127 (1948).
137. Id. at 131.
138. Justice Frankfurter concurred on an alternative basis, however. Id. at 134-35. He rejected the novelty
claim as controlling and was critical of the Court's "law of nature" language because it could be used to frustrate
any claim: all successful patents are by definition an application of some sort of phenomena to a particular end.
The real problem he identified was the scope of the claim: that is, how many similar applications of a principle
could the claim attempt to pre-empt from similar protection? Thus, he also did not address the subject matter
consideration raised by Chakrabarty. Id.
139. As noted previously, see note 133 supra, the predecessor statute did not make the distinction between
subject matter and novelty. The Court's confusing use of Funk Brothers Seed Co. in Chakrabar'y may have
resulted from problems associated with the predecessor statute.
140. 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980).
141. Id. at 310.
19811 1073
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
In summary, the common meanings of the terms Congress used in section
101 do not support the conclusion that living matter is patentable. First, a
persuasive argument can be made that the common view of the patent system
excluded living matter. Second, the terms "manufacture" and "composition
of matter" are so flexible as to defy definition and may be construed to be
inclusive or exclusive. Finally, the distinction the Court drew between na-
turally occurring and man-made animate matter is not persuasive because the
case law cited did not decide the particular question of subject matter cover-
age, but was based on a question of novelty. For these reasons, it is difficult to
conclude, as the Court did, that the use of expansive terms in section 101
meant that a man-made microorganism was patentable under those terms'
general meanings.
2. Congressional Intent
Given the lack of support for the Court's common meanings argument the
second criterion for discerning patentability, congressional intent, is critical.
The legislative record, however, is as cryptic as the terms Congress used.
Initially, it is important to note that the legislative history does not fill the
definitional void found in the terms of section 101. The Senate Report accom-
panying the 1952 codification of the patent laws makes a sweeping statement
that the subject matter provision covers "a machine or a manufacture, which
may include anything under the sun that is made by man .... 42 Congress,
however, bound the section with the baggage of previous statutory language
and court decisions,'43 and the Chakrabarty opinion indicates that reliance is
placed on the pre-1952 cases to define the terms. 144 As noted previously, these
earlier cases left much territory unexplored.
The lack of patent coverage for living matter is reinforced by the legisla-
tive history and enactment of the plant patent statutes. Arguably, the passage
of the plant patent statutes implied that living matter was not patentable under
section 10 1.45 As noted previously, however, the Court adopted a different
view in Chakrabarty.'46 Basing its decision on two factors, the Court first
posited that the changes made in the plant patent law were made to express
congressional disapproval of the "product of nature" doctrine developed by
the Patent Office in Ex parte Latimer 4' and applied to cultivated plant patent
claims. The opinion noted second that the changes made were responsive not
to an absolute exclusion of living matter (if Latimer was refuted), but to the
difficulties of description associated with patenting plants.'4 According to the
142. S. REP. NO. 1979, supra note 29, at 10.
143. See Zinn, Commentary on New Title 35, U.S. Code "Patents," in [19521 U.S. CODE CONG. &AD.
NEWS 2507, 2507.
144. 447 U.S. 303, 308-09 (1980).
145. Id. at 320-21 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
146. Id. at 310-14.
147. 46 OFF. GAZ. PAT. OFF. 1638 (1889).
148. 447 U.S. 303, 312 (1980).
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Court, 4 9 Congress adopted the plant patent statutes to lower that requirement
to "a description ... as complete as reasonably possible." 5 0 The Court con-
cluded that the 1970 statutes, 15' which expanded coverage to sexually repro-
duced plants, reflected a similar concern. 52
Although the Court's view has some basic appeal, a persuasive argument
can be made that the 1930 and 1970 amendments were necessary because
section 101 did not cover living matter. First, the courts have recognized a
distinction of kind between mechanical inventions and plants to the exclusion
of the latter from section 101 coverage. 53 Second, if animate matter were
already within the scope of patentable subject matter, there would have been
no need to enact special coverage for plants by Congress.' Of course, the
obvious response to this argument is that Congress merely meant to lower
requirements for a limited number of plant species and left all other animate
matter to bear the burden of the full description requirements. 115 The legisla-
tive history of the plant statutes, however, lends support to the argument that
plants were not previously within subject matter coverage.
First, the legislative record reflects more than a concern that the "prod-
uct of nature" doctrine of Latimer 56 be overturned. According to testimony
by the Patent Commissioner, the purpose of the 1930 act was "to extend the
benefits of our patent system to certain agricultural discoveries" 157 because
"the present patent law does not make it possible to grant patents for plants
asexually produced." 15 Second, the committee report provided strong evi-
dence that more was intended. The report included a letter from the Secretary
of Agriculture that noted, "This purpose [to promote plant development] was
sought to be accomplished by bringing the reproduction of such newly bred or
found plants under the patent laws which at present time are understood to
cover only inventions or discoveries in the field of inanimate nature." 59
Finally, the committee report of the 1970 act stated, "No protection is avail-
able to those varieties of plants which reproduce sexually, that is, generally
by seeds." "6 Furthermore, the report noted that the plant act was meant to
149. Id.
150. 35 U.S.C. § 162 (1976) provides: -'No plant patent shall be declared invalid for noncompliance with
section 112 of this title [the description requirements of the general patent statute] if the description is as
complete as is reasonably possible."
151. 7 U.S.C. § 2402(a) (1976). See note 16 supra for the text of the statute.
152. 447 U.S. 303, 313 (1980). The legislative history does not explicitly preclude a conclusion that the
purpose was to lower the description standard. H.R. REP. NO. 1605, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1970]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5082.
153. Yoder Brothers, Inc. v. California-Florida Plant Corp., 537 F.2d 1347 (5th Cir. 1976).
154. In re Merat, 519 F.2d 1390, 1393-94 (C.C.P.A. 1975).
155. This view is taken in In re LeGrice, 301 F.2d 929 (C.C.P.A. 1962), and Kim Brothers v. Hagler, 167 F.
Supp. 665 (S.D. Cal. 1958). aff'd, 276 F.2d 259 (9th Cir. 1960).
156. 46 OFF. GAZ. PAT. OFF. 1638 (1889).
157. Hearings on H.R. 11372 beJore the House Committee on Patents, 71 Cong., 2d Sess., 5 (1930).
158. Id. at 6.
159. S. REP. NO. 315, 71st Cong., 2d Sess., 9 (1930) (emphasis added).
160. H.R. REP. NO. 1605, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1970] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5082,
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recognize "new genetic techniques and properties." ' 6' The clear import of
this language is that at least animate matter such as plants was not previously
patentable.
The extension of this language, especially given the statement from the
Secretary of Agriculture adopted in the Committee report, is that animate
matter is not covered by the general terms found in section 101. As the
minority noted, two arguments support this conclusion:
First, the Acts evidence Congress's understanding, at least since 1930, that § 101
does not include living organisms. If newly developed living organisms not na-
turally occurring had been patentable under § 101, the plants included in the scope
of the 1930 and 1970 Acts could have been patented without new legislation.
Second, the 1970 Act clearly indicates that Congress has included bacteria within
the focus of its legislative concern, but not within the scope of plant protec-
tion .... The fact is that Congress, assuming that animate objects as to which it
had not specifically legislated could not be patented, excluded bacteria from the
set of patentable organisms.' 62
Both arguments seem to make a great deal of sense, and both are consistent
with the legislative exclusions Congress has created.
In summary, the second criterion on which the Court chose to make its
decision, legislative intent, fails to justify the Court's conclusion that section
101 was expansive enough to include living matter. Although Congress ap-
parently meant to legislate broad coverage, in essence it adopted the previous
case law without affecting the definitional void the terms represent. More-
over, Congress apparently legislated the plant patent statutes in the belief that
section 101 did not encompass living matter. It follows then that the Court's
conclusion that the congressional history supported patentability of the mi-
croorganism is incorrect.
The problem with the Court's rationale in Chakrabarty appears rooted in
its very justification. Simply, the decision sets two criteria that are not ful-
filled: neither the common meaning of the terms nor the statutory history
support patentability of the microorganism, even if one views section 101 as
an inclusive standard. The solution to this problem may be that the Court has
adopted a policy position that, in itself, provides a justification for the micro-
organism patent.
III. A POLICY APPROACH TO CHAKRABARTY
An initial problem in a policy analysis of Chakrabarty is that policy
guidance in the patent area from the courts is not substantial.' 63 For example,
the Supreme Court usually is not willing to address this question, especially
161. Id. at 5084.
162. 447 U.S. 303, 320-21 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting).




when a decision might serve to expand patent coverage. 64 Justice Brennan, in
his dissent in Chakrabarty, presents this view of the Court's role in patent
policy determinations:
Given the complexity and legislative nature of this delicate task, we must be
careful to extend patent protection no further than Congress has provided. In
particular, were there an absence of legislative direction, the courts should leave
to Congress the decisions whether and how far to extend the patent privilege into
areas where the common understanding has been that patents are not available.165
Thus, when faced with a potential expansion of patent coverage, the Court
usually has not undertaken the effort of reconciling the policy interests, but
has chosen instead to deny the patent until the decision is overruled by con-
gressional action."6
In contrast to the minority view, the majority showed considerably less
restraint in attacking the interpretive questions posed by the microorganism
claims. The Court stated it would not read a limitation into the patent system
unless Congress clearly expressed it.' 67 It further found that its role was to
construe the patent statutes in light of their "broad terms to fulfill the consti-
tutional and statutory goal of promoting 'the Progress of Science and the
useful Arts' with all that means for the social and economic benefits envi-
sioned by Jefferson."'68 The Court concluded, therefore, that a lack of con-
gressional direction regarding living matter would not preclude a patent.169
The Court further opined that laws often are not limited to the particular
concerns Congress has contemplated. 70 The majority considered this inter-
pretive approach especially appropriate in the patent area because otherwise
the lack of anticipation of previously unthought ideas and unmade construc-
tions would be inconsistent with patentability. '" The Court's willingness to
consider these claims by construing the statute in light of an underlying
policy, however, does not explain the Court's result. Indeed, even if the
Court had applied a traditional policy view of the patent system, the claim for
patentability of man-made microorganisms should have been denied.
164. Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 530-31 (1972). Similarly, in Parker v. Flook,
437 U.S. 584 (1978), Justice Stevens wrote:
Difficult questions of policy concerning the kinds of programs that may be appropriate for patent
protection... can be answered by Congress on the basis of current empirical data not equally avail-
able to this tribunal.
It is our duty to construe the patent statutes as they now read, in light of ourprior precedents, and
we must proceed cautiously when we are asked to extend patent rights into areas wholly unforeseen by
Congress.
Id. at 595-96. Cf. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972) (similar result).
165. 447 U.S. 303, 319 (1980). If one accepts the minority view that Congress legislated in the belief that
living matter is not patentable, Brennan's statement is not critical. Arguably, however, there was no congres-
sional direction, see text accompanying notes 142-62, and therefore, this statement is critical to the minority's
conclusion that the patent should have been denied.
166. E.g., Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 73 (1972).
167. 447 U.S. 303, 308 (1980).
168. Id. at 315 (quoting U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8).
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 316.
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A. Reward-Output Constraints Analysis
The Court's usual analysis begins by viewing the issue of patentability as
a tradeoff between, on the one hand, the benefits of encouraging progress by
rewarding inventors and, on the other, the costs inherent in giving the inven-
tor a monopoly in the use of his idea. 72 Viewed in this light, the right to a
patent becomes very difficult to prove because both halves of the balance
constrict patent coverage. "' An examination of the economic policy underly-
ing the Court's usual view of the patent system explains the constricting effect
of this approach.
Historically, the patent system has been viewed as furthering a single
goal of rewarding the efforts of inventors who invest their time, money, and
knowledge in the development of new and useful items.' 74 "The patent is a
reward that enables the inventor to capture the returns from his investment in
the invention, returns that would otherwise (absent secrecy) be subject to
appropriation by others."' 75 If the patent is a reward, then it serves an eco-
nomic function only when it induces efforts that would not otherwise occur.' 76
Under this analysis, if other economic rewards are sufficient to prompt inven-
tive efforts without potential patent protection, then the patent itself has no
justification and should not be awarded. The product would reach the market
with the patent or without it. However, if the costs of the inventive effort are
higher than what the market would return to the inventor, the patent should
be given because it has provided the inventor the additional incentive to
produce that the market alone could not create."7 Viewed as rewards, there-
fore, patents should be made available to the limited class of inventions that
would not have been undertaken but for the additional market advantage the
patent grants the inventor, that is, the exclusive right to his idea for seventeen
years.'78 This naturally constricts the number of patentable inventions to the
few this market approach affects.
The class of patentable inventions is further constricted by the Court's
view that a patent imposes unjustified monopoly costs. The monopoly is a
result of the exclusive rights that the patentee has to control the use of his
product. 9 Based on the assumption that the patentee is working with a
product for which consumption or demand decreases as the price increases,
the inventor can effectively limit the potential social usefulness of his product
172. Justice Brennan wrote, "The patent laws attempt to reconcile this Nation's deep-seated antipathy to
monopolies with the need to encourage progress." 447 U.S. 303, 319 (1980).
173. In fact, the Supreme Court has generally taken an even more aggressive stance against granting
patents by requiring substantial novelty and opening channels for patent challenges for a patent's licensees.
Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & EcON. 265, 282 (1977).
174. 1 A. DELLER, supra note 3, § 6.
175. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265, 282 (1977).
176. Kitch, Graham v. John Deere Co.: New Standards for Patents, 1966 SUP. Cr. REV. 293, 301.
177. Id. at 302. "Only the costlier innovation will be retarded in the absence of patents" because other
innovations have sufficient market demand to induce their invention. Id.




by controlling the marketing of his invention.' 80 The simple explanation is that
the patentee can require a consumer to pay more for the patented product
because the patent limits the number of producers to the patentee and his
assignees. In effect, the patentee corners the market and sets the price not at
the marketprice where supply and demand are roughly equal, but at the point
where the patentee's return is highest. Thus, the patent injures society unless
it is granted only in those cases in which other benefits of its production to
society outweigh the costs society incurs from the award of the patent. The
worth of the patent to society thus becomes the critical issue of patentability:
is the patented product worth a seventeen year monopoly?
8
'
Drawn together, the two halves of the traditional test of patentability
reduce the scope of patentable ideas significantly. To be patentable, the sub-
ject must be one that, first, would not have been produced in the absence of
potential patent protection, and second, would provide benefits that exceed
the additional costs created by the monopoly effects of the patent.
If the Court had viewed the patent as a reward and placed Chakrabarty's
claims into the cost and benefit balance, it should have denied the patent. The
reason for the denial would have been based simply on the fact that no reward
or incentive was necessary to induce the inventive effort. In rejecting argu-
ments that the patent should not be granted because of the attendant risks of
genetic research, the Court stated:
The large amount of research that has already occurred when no researcher had
sure knowledge that patent protection would be available suggests that legislative
or judicial fiat as to patentability will not deter the scientific mind from probing
into the unknown .... Whether respondent's claims are patentable may deter-
mine whether research efforts are accelerated by the hope of reward or slowed by
want of incentives but that is all.' 82
Clearly, if research would continue regardless of patentability, then the incen-
tive justification alone does not explain the Court's decision. Indeed, the
claims would not reach the second step of balancing the benefits and costs of
the monopoly rights. Therefore, the patent for the microorganism is not justi-
fied by a traditional patent system analysis.
B. Prospect Analysis
If the purpose of the patent system goes beyond providing an incentive to
inventors, however, a patent for the microorganism may be justified. The
alternative justification may be based on viewing the patent as a claim or
prospect. A patent, viewed in this way, creates in the inventor a right to
develop a novel idea free from outside interference, or in Kitch's phrase, "a
particular opportunity to develop a known technological possibility." 83 The
180. Kitch, supra note 173, at 266-67.
181. Id. at 284.
182. 447 U.S. 303, 317 (1980).
183. Kitch, supra note 173, at 266.
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patent claim is analogous to a mineral or land claim: the claim creates in its
holder the right to use the land (or not to use it) in any manner he chooses
regardless of its eventual commercial worth. 8' Similarly, the patent creates in
its holder the right to develop his idea commercially without fear of its loss to
others, regardless of the value of the idea.
There is strong evidence that the prospect function exists in the Ameri-
can patent system. First, the patent system encompasses both successful and
unsuccessful ideas. If the patent system were only reward-oriented, thou-
sands of patented ideas that are commercially useless would not be patent-
able; however, commercial worthiness has not been a criterion of patent-
ability.' 85 Second, patent rules cover not the most useful application for an
idea, but the first claim. 86 If the system were purely reward-oriented, prefer-
ence would be given to the former, but clearly it has not been.'87 Third, in
practice a patent often is issued long before the idea is commercially market-
able.' 88 Thus, the practical effect of the prospect function in the American
system is that it allocates to the patentee the right to attempt to develop his
idea. 89
If one recognizes that the patent system protects prospects, the key issue
then becomes the recognition of a range of prospects that the system should
protect. Although Kitch has not discussed this question with regard to section
10 1, his analysis of section 102 and section 103 seems applicable because the
sections together define patentability. He states that the question of patent-
ability centers on whether the information is worth further investigation.90
Thus, a patentable prospect is identified as the application of an idea to a
particular end that deserves further investigation, a test that provides some
limitation: an idea alone is not patentable unless it is advanced in some tech-
nological application from which a benefit might result. '9' Therefore, not only
are "worthy" ideas patentable, but potentially worthy ones are also.' gz By
definition, then, a patent system that protects claims or prospects is more
expansive than one that consists only of rewards. Thus, if the patent system is
viewed as prospect-oriented, it is an encompassing system, rather than an
exclusionary one.
184. Id. at 271-75.
185. Id. at 267-69.
186. Id. at 269-70.
187. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103 (1976).
188. Kitch, supra note 173, at 270-72 (chart demonstrating time differences between patent approval and
commercial introduction).
189. Id. at 266. Kitch argues that a number of benefits flow from the early allocation of a prospect. First,
the allocation increases investment efficiency because the patentee can eliminate duplicative efforts. Second, it
improves production because the patentee controls commercial improvements. Third, it lowers information
costs of buyers because anyone wishing to use the patent knows the extent of the patentee's rights. Fourth,
early release of the information lowers the waste of duplicative research. Fifth, it eliminates the costs of
maintaining secrecy. Last, it improves the structure for innovation because the incentive system is generally
uniform. Id. at 275-80.





Arguably, the Court in Chakrabarty moved towards recognition of the
prospect function. It is clear the Court rejected internal limitations of patent-
ability that Congress has not stated.'93 Further, the Court seemed more in-
terested in promoting efforts without any particular regard to foreseeable
benefits. 194 Noting that "the inventions most benefiting mankind are those
that 'push back the frontiers of chemistry, physics, and the like,"" 95 the
Court stated, "Congress employed broad general language in drafting § 101
precisely because such inventions are often unforeseeable." 196 Moreover, the
Court rejected the argument that its decision would stop genetic research, a
conclusion fatal to Chakrabarty's claim if the Court's decision were based
only on a reward orientation. 97 The Court did note, however, that the rate of
development would be affected by the hope of reward.' 98 This seems con-
sistent with the effect of an improved incentive structure that results from
early allocation of prospects that Kitch hypothesized.' 99 Thus, there is some
evidence that the Court did view the patent system as prospect-oriented.
This evidence alone, however, is not especially effective in making the
case that the Court has moved to a prospect orientation. At best, one can say
that a simple reward approach would not justify the patent and then draw the
few policy arguments the Court does make into a tentative argument that
there is a prospect orientation influencing the opinion. Simply, the Court does
not answer the single policy question posited previously-whether the claim
deserves further development-and thus fails to completely adopt a prospect
approach.
However, the argument of a prospect approach may be posed hypotheti-
cally. Arguably, the policy question is answered affirmatively by the Court:
the microorganism's development apparently was worth pursuing. As the
Court noted, "Chakrabarty's invention is believed to have significant value
for the treatment of oil spills.,, 210 Moreover, the Court noted that the general
idea of engineering the addition of peculiar properties into microorganisms is
one that deserves further consideration. 20' Thus, the microorganism repre-
sents a prospect, the application of an idea of significance deserving further
review. Judging the claim in prospect terms, therefore, the decision to grant
the patent for this microorganism is consistent with a patent policy to promote
technological advancement at the edges of man's knowledge for practical
social benefits.2 2
193. 447 U.S. 303, 308 (1980) (quoting United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178 (1933)
(Douglas, J.. concurring)).
194. Id. at 314-15.
195. Id. at 316.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 317.
198. Id.
199. Kitch, supra note 173, at 279.
200. 447 U.S. 303, 305 n.2 (1980) (emphasis added).
201. Id. at 305 n.l.
202. Id. at 315.
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IV. NEW DIRECTIONS
Whether this interpretation of Chakrabarty represents the Court's pos-
ture, of course, will be answered by its future decisions in the patent area. If
the case is a harbinger of a judicial policy shift away from a reward theory
limited by an output constraint bias, the significance of Chakrabarty is sub-
stantial. First, the case indicates a clearer and more favorable patent policy
approach. Although numerous authors have suggested direct efforts by Con-
gress to effectuate what the Court did in Chakrabarty,2 °3 the policy role of the
judiciary should not be dismissed too quickly. On a day-to-day basis, special-
ized courts like the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals bring expertise to
patent questions. An example of the policy redefinition may be found in that
court's handling of recent computer software cases that, building on the
Supreme Court's decisions, 204 recognize the patentability of computer proc-
esses. 2 5 This too may be perceived as an emergence of a prospect analysis of
the section 101 definitional area, an approach that provides for changes that
Congress seems unwilling to make but that are consistent with patent policy.
A second and more practical aspect of the Chakrabarty policy choice is
the stabilizing effect it may have on inventive efforts, which clearly is one of
the advantages of an inclusive patent system. There is evidence to suggest
that an exclusionary process frustrates and slows development and produc-
tion because either the incentive structure is uncertain or trade secrecy re-
quirements make production costs prohibitive.2° In the case of microorgan-
ism research, there appears little chance research will stop;20 7 and clearly, the
significant social benefits that are the possible result of applied genetic re-
search may independently provide incentives. 08 Conditions for promoting
research and development, however, could be disrupted, as the Court noted
in Chakrabarty.z° If social desires dictate that these inventions are not
wanted, Congress, not the courts, might legislate the result through research
and production restrictions or patent subject matter constrictions.2 '0 The
203. See, e.g., Note, Legislation for the Patenting of Living Organisms: Specificity, Public Safety and
Ethical Considerations, 7 J. LEG. 113 (1980).
204. E.g., Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
205. The Court has recently permitted patents on computer processes. In Diamond v. Diehr. 101 S. Ct.
1048 (1981), the Court upheld a patent for a rubber molding process that constantly updates itself, presenting
issues very much like the problem in Flook. In Diamond v. Bradley, 101 S. Ct. 1495 (1981) (mem.), bya4-4 vote
the Court let stand a patent for a mechanical structure for operating a multiprogran format. One article correctly
anticipated that Chakrabarty would favorably affect the chances that these claims would be successful because
they were not per se laws of nature or expressly excluded by Congress, the two exclusionary criteria recognized
by the Court. Blumenthal & Riter, Statutory or Non-Statutory?: An Analysis of the Patentability of Computer
Related Inventions, 62 J. PAT. OFF. 454, 516 (1980).
206. Rqote, Microbiological Plant Patents, 10 IDEA 87, 88-91 (1966).
207. See, e.g., the discussion of the recent Lasker Award given for genetic research. Washington Post,
Nov. 20, 1980, at 6, col. 5.
208. Note, Legislation for the Patenting of Living Organisms: Specificity, Public Safety and Ethical
Considerations, 7 J. LEG. 113, 115-17 (1980).
209. 447 U.S. 303, 317 (1980).
210. Id.
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patent scheme as it stands, however, will promote inventive efforts and sta-
bility in the allocation of potentially successful prospects.
Thus, the Chakrabarty decision poses significant policy questions that
need further consideration. If the Court is moving toward a more encompas-
sing patent system by using a prospect-oriented approach to patent policy,
researchers of many important developments in various technical industries
may look forward to patent protection that otherwise would not be available
under a reward-oriented patent system, a result in keeping with the goal of
promoting the useful arts. As usual, however, only time will tell.
Frank P. Darr

